THE 1858 "NAVAL SCARE"
In England the naval position was now far from satisfactory.
The news of the commencement of the French ironclad fleet in March did not become known in London until the following May, when it was received with a rising apprehension, which in Parliament and press was fanned into what has become euphemistically termed a "panic" as rumors of a big shipbuilding program reached Westminster. The Gloire and her sisters were described as "huge polished steel frigates" and credited with power which, although they "plunged some persons into deep distress … were manifestly put forward to excite our foolish fears." To allay the well-grounded sense of insecurity caused by these new weapons of war, a Parliamentary Committee was formed in 1858 to enquire into the relative naval strength of the two countries, but the report published the following year did nothing towards providing any reassurance. It made disquieting reading. Omitting all sailing ships-now recognized as having no war value against steamships -- it was found that both England and France had 39 ships-of-the-line built or completing, while France had 34 large frigates (not including the ironclads) against our 26.
"So convinced are naval men in France," note the Committee, "of the irresistible qualities of these ships [the ironclads] that they are of the opinion that no more ships-of-the-line will be laid down, and that in ten years that class of vessel will have become obsolete."
But to meet this alarming situation the Committee could recommend nothing but half-measures. Although the problem of countering the French designs required a drastic change in our appreciation of the elements of sea power, the only course bewildered experts could visualize was an accelerated conversion of the remaining ships to Steam!
Behind this very unsatisfactory recommendation was the reactionary influence of Sir Howard Douglas, the veteran artillerist now in his eighty-third year. Implacably opposed both to iron hulls and Armour, his advice was still accepted by Palmerston -- as he stated it had been by Sir Robert Peel when the decision was taken to convert the Simooms into troopers-although the great protagonist of iron ships, John Scott Russell, was very soon r confound his arguments and bring Ministerial opinion into line with scientific achievement.
The Admiralty was therefore in a quandary. There were divided opinions as to whether we should follow the French lead and out build them in ironclads; or push ahead with both ironclads and wooden ships, modifying the building programs as circumstances dictated; or build up our superiority again along traditional lines with the requisite number of wooden ships -- which was the course adopted for a short time.
So for the moment wooden walls were given pride of place in Britain's defenses, and a further program of ships-of-the-line was put in hand -- of which only those ultimately completed as ironclads were ever set afloat.
WANING PRESTIGE OF THE THREE-DECKER
With the Howe, Victoria, Prince of Wales and Windsor Casile the wooden walls reached their acme of development. Apart from great size -- and they were twice the tonnage of the Victory -- their armament consisted of shell guns of the largest caliber with a 68-pdr. mounted up in bows to provide chase fire which was difficult to secure from the guns at the turn of the bows. All these guns had sights which enabled hits to he made at ranges beyond point-blank, when shells could be driven through the sides of any ship at 1,2O0 yards or more and then burst inside her. Moreover, with these increased ranges had come a much wider dispersion of fire. A broadside could now be directed at two ships, which was impossible under the "close-alongside" tactics, and thus the need for a three-deck concentration no longer obtained. Under these changed conditions the 130-gun ship was becoming an anachronism. The huge armament meant a great vulnerable target, with a draught of water limiting employment to the high seas and debarring her from operating in shallow waters or off-shore on b1ockade -- which were the conditions chiefly found during the Crimean War.